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Durkheim and Society as a Moral Entity: 
 A Brief Synopsis and Critique 
 
 
Andrew Oberg 
 
I. Introduction 
Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) lived and died during turbulent times not only for his 
native France but also for all of Europe. During his youth France suffered a crushing 
defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, with it the passing of the Second 
Empire, the birth of the Third Republic, and the short-lived and much discussed 
Paris Commune, while at the time of his death Europe was embroiled in the first 
World War with Russia having passed through two distinct revolutions in a single 
year. It is not surprising then, as one of the founding fathers of the discipline of 
sociology, that Durkheim was greatly concerned with the questions of social 
structure and morality. His views on the societal origin of morality, however, have 
been as controversial as they have been influential, and thus the present paper will 
seek to elucidate those views through an examination of modern academic research 
done on both Durkheim’s earlier works and his latter. The structure of Durkheim’s 
society as a moral entity will be discussed, followed by a look at the place Durkheim 
gave the individual in society, and finally some criticisms of Durkheim’s views will be 
offered. Writing nearly a century before the present though he did, there is perhaps 
something of Durkheim that we can apply to our own times of questioning amidst 
rapid change. 
 
II. Society as a moral entity 
One of the most striking features of Durkheim’s conception of society is the collective 
effervescence that forms its group mind. He attributed to society a will of its own, an 
ability to think, feel, wish, and act in its own right.1 Society is thus self-aware, and 
endowed with a higher consciousness than individuals as it is composed of the 
                             
1 Whitney Pope, ‘Durkheim as a Functionalist’, The Sociological Quarterly, 16:3 (1975), 
361-379. 
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collective consciousnesses of all individuals within it,2 arising out of those members’ 
collective effervescence. This idea is closely linked to Durkheim’s notion of homo 
duplex, that all of us are internally divided between egoistic impulses and our ability 
to go beyond ourselves into a realm of ‘conceptual thought and moral activity held in 
common by a society’.3 This collective mind then functions by protecting individuals, 
when interacting with one another, from the disturbance of their sensory perceptions, 
allowing them to substitute the world around them for a more moral one, a medium 
that also acts as the basis for the social structuring of emotions.4 Thus, the moral 
force that society exerts does in fact come from the separately existing entity ‘society’ 
itself, but that entity can be understood as being generated by its members. In this 
way, Durkheim’s view of society as a moral power can be understood to mean 
morality developing as a social phenomenon rather than society developing as a 
moral one.5 This entity of society, once created, could however also cease to be 
should the idea of society disappear from its members’ minds, being rooted in their 
collective effervescence as it is.6 Durkheim saw the increasing division of labor as 
one such potential weakening agent of collective sentiments, the substitute social 
cohesive he suggested will be discussed below. This may all strike the reader as 
being quite strange and esoteric, and so a helpful analogy may perhaps be taken 
here from Hindu theology. Vedantic philosophy, rooted in the Upanishads, and 
especially that of the Advaitan school, teaches that the ultimate reality of the entire 
universe is one supreme consciousness, that all is connected into this one reality, 
that it supports all, flows through all, and yet is beyond all.7 Taking this concept and 
localizing it, as well as allowing it to be self-generated rather than pre-existent, we 
have an idea of how Durkheim saw society as something other than its members and 
yet created by its members; something very much along the lines of ‘the whole is 
                             
2 ibid. 
3 Chris Shilling and Philip A. Mellor, ‘Durkheim, Morality and Modernity: Collective 
Effervescence, Homo Duplex and the Sources of Moral Action’, The British Journal of Sociology, 
49:2 (1998), 193-209 (p. 196). 
4 ibid. 
5 T. M. S. Evens, ‘Two Concepts of “Society as a Moral System”: Evans-Pritchard’s Heterodoxy’, 
Man, 17:2 (1982), 205-218. 
6 Shilling and Mellor, op. cit. 
7 Upanishads, trans. by F Max-Müller, rev. and intro. by Suren Navlakha (Hertfordshire: 
Wordsworth Editions, 2000). 
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greater than the sum of its parts’.  
 
This entity of society (or, perhaps more fitting to the view heretofore discussed, 
Society) exerts a tremendous moral force over its members and to a large, even total, 
degree dictates their behavior. When born, each person faces the society where they 
live as an objective reality with a moral quality that is beyond any one individual’s 
control.8 A person does not choose to believe in certain things or act in certain ways; 
he or she learns them through the process of socialization.9 The objective nature of 
Durkheim’s society is quite important in that it not only dictates norms (or ‘social 
facts’, that is, collectively held standards of behavior,10 also seen as endowed with a 
coercive power over individuals11) but obliges each person to experience reality in 
certain ways and not in others, it causes each separate individual to view him or 
herself as a cultural object,12 and therefore composes both one’s view of the outside 
world and one’s sense of identity and place in that world. Society has both a physical 
and moral force that it uses to control its members, making them feel, think, and act, 
as society, in its higher wisdom, deems necessary to achieve the equilibrium that is 
its goal.13 Society can thus regenerate itself throughout the gradual process of 
inevitable change that occurs within all human groupings, whether coming from 
advances in technology or adjustments to a changing environment, by continually 
exerting moral force and behavioral control over each of the members composing 
that society. In summation, according to Durkheim, society is a separate entity 
created by its members, an entity that is both above and beyond them and entirely 
moral; the moral force it exerts, moreover ‘controls and assimilates to individual 
consciousness to such an extent that flouting it is for the most part unthinkable, and 
its status as moral constraint may even go unnoticed’.14 
                             
8 Richard A. Hilbert, ‘Anomie and the Moral Regulation of Reality: The Durkheimian 
Tradition in Modern Relief’, Sociological Theory, 4:1 (1986), 1-19. 
9 Pip Jones, Liz Bradbury, and Shaun Le Boutillier, Introducing Social Theory, 2nd edn 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011). 
10 ibid., see also Shilling and Mellor, op. cit. 
11 Murray Knuttila, Introducing Sociology: A Critical Approach, 3rd edn (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
12 Hilbert, op. cit. 
13 Pope, op. cit. 
14 Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method (New York: The Free Press, 1938) p. 55, 
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III. The individual in society 
As controlling and pervasive as Durkheim’s concept of society is, there is still a place 
for the individual within it. In fact, Durkheim saw the individual becoming more 
and more central as society developed within modern cultures from an increasing 
division of labor. While social cohesiveness was achieved in pre-modern societies due 
to ‘mechanical solidarity’, the solidarity that comes about more or less automatically 
from the similarity of people’s lives and limited number of available roles, modern 
societies are held together by ‘organic solidarity’, that which comes from the 
interdependence resulting from each person having a very specialized and limited 
role within society.15 To Durkheim, in addition to bringing about organic solidarity, 
such specific roles also play a large part in giving meaning and purpose to life, 
arguing that ‘our work makes sense only because it serves something other than 
ourselves. The individual is not an end sufficient unto himself.’16 One’s occupational 
function was so important to Durkheim that he suggested occupational groups could 
succeed the family in its economic and moral functions, giving a sense of security, 
place, and belonging to each individual.17 Through the organic solidarity that is 
built in such a way, and reflecting its developing pluralistic nature, society becomes 
bound together increasingly by the beliefs and values that its members share rather 
than a set of common behavioral patterns, and in modernity the core of those beliefs 
and values is individualism. To modern people, the individual is sacred and 
‘individualism is our public religion’.18 That individualism should take on such 
importance to each of us is explained by Durkheim in that since there are fewer 
common ideas and fewer common perspectives in modern societies, the authority of 
such institutions as the state or religious orders weakens, forcing society to rely 
more on its individual members.19 Furthermore, although this is not explicitly 
stated, as the entity of society directly influences how its members think in 
                                                                       
in Hilbert, op. cit., p. 2. 
15 Jones et al., op. cit. 
16 Emile Durkheim, ‘The Conjugal Family’, in On Institutional Analysis, trans., ed., and intro. 
by Mark Traugott (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1978 [1892]), pp. 
229-239 (p. 236). 
17 ibid. The same point is repeated in Shilling and Mellor, op. cit. 
18 Steven Seidman, Contested Knowledge, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, Ltd., 1998), 
p. 61. 
19 ibid. 
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Durkheim’s system, it could very well cause each member to consider individualism 
as an important value to hold. Thus, organic solidarity is created through general 
norms and values stemming from individualism, such as ‘justice’ and ‘equality’, and 
not through society dictating specific behaviors outright.20 In fact, the rights and 
dignity that society accords the individual comes to be, in Durkheim’s thought, the 
most significant value consensus in advanced societies.21 In his later writings, this 
point came to be the knot holding together public morality in the entity that is 
society, its moral foundation being one of interdependence and acceptance of 
individual differences.22 
 
Moreover, it must be remembered that in Durkheim’s view of society each individual 
contributes to generating the higher and all-encompassing entity of society itself, 
making each member a necessary part of the whole. Through his notion of homo 
duplex Durkheim proposed the method by which such a transcendent being could 
come into existence, via the collective consciousness generated by individuals 
interacting within groups. Considered from a long-term perspective, and Durkheim 
did take such an evolutionary approach to social questions,23 how such interactions 
could contribute over time to the birth of a society is rather plain to see. Additionally, 
morality for Durkheim had a strong social character, so that an action is considered 
moral if and only if it is directed towards an impersonal or social end; morality 
begins and ends with life in the group.24 This view also helps explain the terrible 
weight Durkheim’s concept of anomie would place on an individual, as the 
disconnect an anomically afflicted person felt from the society all around them would 
be alienating and emotionally exhausting. Hilbert makes the comparison here 
between a person alone in a foreign country experiencing anomie from his or her 
culture shock, from not being able to relate in any way to their external reality, as 
opposed to the experience of that same reality that the natives of the country have, 
                             
20 Charles E. Marske, ‘Durkheim’s “Cult of the Individual” and the Moral Reconstitution of 
Society’, Sociological Theory, 5:1 (1987), 1-14. 
21 ibid. 
22 ibid. 
23 Seidman, op. cit. 
24 Evens, op. cit. 
駿河台大学論叢 第45号(2012) 
―174― 
which of course would not be anomic in the least.25 It should be noted, however, that 
Hilbert was writing in general terms here, as Durkheim’s anomie could afflict a 
person in their own birth society; occurrences of such were considered by Durkheim 
to be a potential cause of suicide and he further saw anomie increasing with the 
advancing of the division of labor, a cause of some concern in his analysis of modern 
societies.26 
 
IV. Problems with Durkheim’s views 
To my mind, there are a number of serious problems with Durkheim’s views on 
society as a moral entity, and with how society comes to be structured. First and 
foremost, despite the goal Durkheim had of approaching the study of societies from a 
scientific methodology built upon a firm empirical basis,27 he does not seem to have 
based much of his theoretical analysis on case studies of any specific and naturally 
occurring societies.28 His analysis rather remains almost always in the abstract, and 
he was never able to show empirically how such institutions that he deemed 
necessary came into existence (other than to state that necessity explains existence, 
creating a classificatory scheme he could not convincingly validate).29 Furthermore, 
although his view of society existing as a separate entity created and nourished by 
the contributions of each member in a collective effervescence was based on 
observations of collective behavior, it is difficult to see such evidence as having 
enough strength to warrant the conclusion drawn. Durkheim’s view of society may 
not necessarily be a priori in that he does allow for it to gradually form via group 
interactions building up over long periods of time (think here of small bands of 
hunter-gatherers gradually joining (whether forced together through conquest or by 
consensus) to become a tribe, and then tribes of similar customs and languages 
gradually joining to become a nation, creating their society bit by bit as they go 
along), but it is still metaphysical in nature and seems to me a long way from being 
scientifically sound. Additionally, such an entity is given the somewhat disturbing 
                             
25 Hilbert, op. cit. 
26 ibid. 
27 Jones et al., op. cit. 
28 Marske, op. cit. 
29 Pope, op. cit. 
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power of total moral control over the individuals whose consciousnesses mystically 
combine to form it. That society influences the way we behave is unquestionable, but 
to state that ‘flouting [society’s control] is for the most part unthinkable’30 is 
granting a far stronger capacity than I, at least, am comfortable in assigning to it. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most crucially, Durkheim’s work almost entirely avoids 
discussing the conflicts that occur between groups within societies. The axis of 
opposition that Durkheim uses is one of social-individual, with deviations being 
termed ‘nonsocial’ and ‘pathological’.31 Social location, differing interests, and that 
some members of a society may use their positions of institutional advantage to help 
themselves and their friends at the expense of other members of society, all get short 
shrift from Durkheim.32 This despite increasing foci on social justice and the need to 
equalize the conditions of competition within society that are marks of his later 
works.33 Durkheim may have been merely trying not to be Marx by donning such 
rosy-colored glasses, but the end result is that he comes across as very strongly 
justifying the status quo, to the point that in his view whatever social structure, 
arrangements, and institutions any given society has are the natural outcomes of 
the necessary functions they serve.34 Such a stance can logically only lead to a docile 
acceptance of whatever one may feel to be wrong with one’s society. I cannot help but 
think that that would stand in strong contrast to the republican ideals Durkheim 
hoped to uphold,35 yet that nevertheless seems to be the position he took. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Emile Durkheim was one of the most important social thinkers of his time, and his 
legacy within the field of sociology is not in question. His work helped to secure that 
discipline as an independent area of scientific study and paved the way for 
generations of sociologists to come. His concerns with morality, social cohesion, and 
                             
30 Durkheim, in Hilbert, op. cit., p. 2. 
31 Pope, op. cit. 
32 ibid. 
33 Marske, op. cit. 
34 Jones et al., op. cit. 
35 Seidman, op. cit. 
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smoothly functioning social institutions were valid and important not only for his 
own time and place. However, in an examination of his views on society as a moral 
entity, the place of individuals within society, and some of the problems associated 
with those views, significant flaws have been revealed in his overall theoretical 
system. While his analysis of the outcomes that an increasing division of labor (with 
the resultant shifting of societal mores towards a strongly favorable view of 
individualism and individual rights and dignity) has brought to modern societies 
may be sound, as well as his ideas of society forming out of group interactions and 
carrying with it a moral influence that is exerted on the members of that society, his 
notion of a self-existent and morally controlling entity that exists as society appears 
to be very much in error. Moreover, Durkheim’s failure to address the very real and 
significant social and economic distress that certain groups within society face at the 
hands of other groups in society must be seen as a grave omission. The world may 
have much to thank Durkheim for, particularly his emphases on social morality and 
group cohesion, but on the whole his work did not point the way forwards for the 
people of his own time, and nor does it do so for ours. 
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